Post by arfanho7 on Feb 27, 2024 4:57:14 GMT -6
We find that top executives strategically realized their built in capital gains prior to the tax hikes to save nearly million in personal taxes in . These executives also make payout policy choices that save their shareholders taxes and make tax strategy choices that save their firms cash taxes.
Their firms altered payout policies in distributing billion in special and accelerated dividends to save shareholders nearly million in taxes. Further each tax minded executive reduces a firm s cash effective tax rate by . . Download working paper http hbs faculty Pages item.aspx num Sharing Private Information with Customers Strategic Default and Lender Learning By Pérez Cavazos Gerardo ABSTRACT—I use a unique data set of loans to small business owners to examine whether lenders face negative externalities when they Hungary Phone Number share private information with borrowers. When lenders grant debt forgiveness to borrowers borrowers communicate that information to other borrowers who are then more likely to strategically default on their own obligations. This strategic default contagion is economically large. When the lender doubles debt forgiveness contagion causes the default rate to increase by . on average. to the lender s forgiveness policy I further show that as the lender learns about the extent of borrower communication it tightens its debt forgiveness and origination policies to reduce information spillovers and mitigate the default contagion. Collectively these results provide new evidence on the strategic interactions between a firm and its customers in a dynamic information environment.
Download working paper http hbs faculty Pages item.aspx num A Normative Theory of Dynamic Capabilities Connecting Strategy Know How and Competition By Pisano Gary P. ABSTRACT—The field of strategy has mounted an enormous effort to understand define predict and measure how organizational capabilities shape competitive advantage.
Their firms altered payout policies in distributing billion in special and accelerated dividends to save shareholders nearly million in taxes. Further each tax minded executive reduces a firm s cash effective tax rate by . . Download working paper http hbs faculty Pages item.aspx num Sharing Private Information with Customers Strategic Default and Lender Learning By Pérez Cavazos Gerardo ABSTRACT—I use a unique data set of loans to small business owners to examine whether lenders face negative externalities when they Hungary Phone Number share private information with borrowers. When lenders grant debt forgiveness to borrowers borrowers communicate that information to other borrowers who are then more likely to strategically default on their own obligations. This strategic default contagion is economically large. When the lender doubles debt forgiveness contagion causes the default rate to increase by . on average. to the lender s forgiveness policy I further show that as the lender learns about the extent of borrower communication it tightens its debt forgiveness and origination policies to reduce information spillovers and mitigate the default contagion. Collectively these results provide new evidence on the strategic interactions between a firm and its customers in a dynamic information environment.
Download working paper http hbs faculty Pages item.aspx num A Normative Theory of Dynamic Capabilities Connecting Strategy Know How and Competition By Pisano Gary P. ABSTRACT—The field of strategy has mounted an enormous effort to understand define predict and measure how organizational capabilities shape competitive advantage.